Yeshiva
Beit Midrash
- Sections
- Chemdat Yamim
- P'ninat Mishpat
Ruling: [The first installment will deal with def’s claim that he should not be bound by the conditions of the contract that he had not read.]
The Rashba, in a few reponsa, deals with the claim of one who said he did not understand part of an agreement to which he ostensibly obligated himself. In one place (V, 228) he rejects such a claim, pointing out that otherwise one could never be held to even a valid agreement.
In contrast, in a responsum (I, 1156) about a bride who signed a document stating that a certain property was not hers, the Rashba writes: "she makes a strong claim when saying that she did not understand or hear the contents of the document, because we all know that a bride is not heedful to what it says in her ketuba." In another responsum, about a document written in a language that the party did not understand, the Rashba writes that we can assume that he relied on his advisers and obligated himself in whatever is written in the document. In that case, we see that knowing that he does not understand is actually reason to be obligated.
Some say that the Rashba changed his mind. The Knesset Hagedola (CM 147:8) suggests two ways of reconciling the response: 1) One cannot claim ignorance on major clauses, but can deny acceptance of side points. 2) We must decide, based on the person who obligated himself, whether it makes sense that he did not know.
In general, the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (CM 61:13) say that one cannot claim that he was unaware of the document’s contents. However, some claim that in extreme cases, we would say that the one obligating himself did not understand. For example, the Mishneh Halachot (XVII, 98) says that if one signed an arbitration agreement that accepts a ruling even if it is based on an outright mistake, we can assume he did not to agree to such an illogical condition.
In our case, none of the reasons to assume that def did not accept the condition applies. The stipulation in question is at the heart of the matter. A normal renter reads a rental agreement, certainly if he signed it himself. The condition of paying until the end of the rental period is not illogical. Therefore, the stipulation of paying until the end of the rental period even if the renter moves out is valid.
[Next time we will investigate whether the condition is valid under unusual circumstances.]
P'ninat Mishpat (835)
Various Rabbis
192 - Pay for Imperfect Work
193 - Aborted Rental
194 - Unsigned Estimates for a Contractor
Load More
P'ninat Mishpat P'ninat Mishpat: A Seller with Questionable Rights to the Property – part I
based on ruling 84062 of the Eretz Hemdah-Gazit Rabbinical Courts
P'ninat Mishpat P'ninat Mishpat: A Contractor’s Leaving the Job in the Middle – part III
based on ruling 84013 of the Eretz Hemdah-Gazit Rabbinical Courts
P'ninat Mishpat P'ninat Mishpat: Agricultural Water Rights – part I
based on ruling 84122 of the Eretz Hemdah-Gazit Rabbinical Courts
Rabbis in Midrash
Lessons
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Various Events FOR WHOM NOT TO VOTE
Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook stressed that Israeli politics is G-dly, so I have no problem answering this common question on a Torani blog. Also, Free-Will is a G-d-given right and obligation, to "destine one's fate" (R. Soloveichik, Kol Dodi Dofek, 67), so I obviously don't tell others how to vote. But once not a few (especially young) have already asked, a couple of personal words from experience and thoughts from chazal & Rav Kook which may be of help to others, mainly for whom NOT to vote.
P'ninat Mishpat Fallout from Failure to Install Elevator – part II
based on ruling 85007 of the Eretz Hemdah-Gazit Rabbinical Courts
