P'ninat Mishpat: What is Included in Costs of the Elevator? | Beit Din Eretz Hemda - Gazit | Beit Midrash

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Case: The administration of a yishuv (=pl) rented out a building to the defendant (=def), a company that builds medical buildings, so that it could make a kupat cholim. The sides have a dispute about the building of an elevator on the outside of the building. Originally, pl was to finance building the elevator and towards that purpose took a loan of 300,000 NIS. Later on, it was decided, and written in a contract, that def would assume the financing of the elevator, and they paid back pl for their expenses, and pl returned the loan. Pl is suing def for the interest and the fee for opening up a loan portfolio regarding the loan they took solely to finance the elevator, which comes to 12,552 NIS, which must be added to the principal, as was discussed orally (def denies the oral agreement). Pl claims that the fact that, in the new agreement, pl lowered the rent is specifically because def agreed to broadly accept expenses connected to the elevator. Def responded that the contract specifies what expenses need to be paid and the financing of the elevator is not mentioned.

Ruling: Par. 1b of the new contract says: "Def will return to pl the expenses of building the elevator shaft and also the expense of buying the elevator and its installation in the shaft." Since it does not mention financing of the loan, pl should not be able to demand compensation. Financing is a distinctly different expense from the ones mentioned. There is additional reason in this case because pl had available a possibility of funding without interest and did not take it. Since financing is a very individualistic expense, there is no reason to simply assume that def would be obligated in it.
If def had sent pl to take the loan, it could have been def’s responsibility to pay its costs, but this was not claimed, let alone proved. Even if there were a doubt if the obligation included these costs, we resolve doubts by putting the burden of proof on the one who wants to extract money (i.e., pl).
At some point, def inquired about the interest that pl was paying, but there is documentation of his surprise at how much it was and his refusal, before signature on the agreement, to pay for it. Beit din understands that def was aware of interest payments but was only willing to pay for it if it had been a small amount of money. The implication of the documentation is that the reason for def’s discount in rent is the fact that pl wanted to own the elevator after the period of rental, not due to any agreement of def to pay interest.
Finally, beit din rejects pl’s claim that regarding property in Judea and Samaria, where governmental involvement in real estate commerce is weaker, agreements are more fluid and one should follow credible claims about oral agreements relatively more than the precise wording of a contract. Beit din is not aware of and does not accept such a geographical distinction. Furthermore, in this case, there is a very carefully written contract, and it makes no sense to claim that it is not to be taken seriously.