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Part II

“Economic Difficulty”- the Most Common Excuse for Not Making Aliya

In the previous part, we asked how much does one need to lower their standard of living in order to make Aliya. We saw that one should spend up to a fith of his money on Mitzvot and asked if lowering of standard of life is considered a loss of a fifth?
Rabbi Ari ShvatShvat 5773
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D. The Application of the Decree of Usha Regarding the Mitzvah of Living in Israel
One of the cardinal questions we must deal with, is why the Decree of Usha, not to lavish on the fulfillment of a mitzvah more than a fifth (or a tenth), isn’t mentioned at all in any of the rishonim and achronim regarding the topic of living in Israel. On the contrary, we find a totally different, and much more minimal financial condition necessary to exempt one from living in Israel, that is if he has to go begging.
For example, the Rashbash (rishon, d. 1467/שכ"ז) writes that if "in Israel he won’t have enough money for food, or he won’t have enough money to make aliya and he will have to beg from other people, the Torah and the Sages did not obligate him to make aliya". 1 Similarly, the Maharit rules that "anyone who will only be able to live there in poverty, this is considered "Ones" (has no choice), 2 and the Ya'avetz, R. Ya’akov Emdin as well, "Every Jew has to make a permanent and definite decision in his heart to make aliya and live in Israel, at least when he will have enough money to cover the expenses and a bit of money to make a living , either through labor or through business to receive the required money to settle the Holy Land, which is desolate without her children". He continues to explain that the obligation to make aliya is conditional upon, "that he has the expenses for the journey 3 and to make " some form of minimal income" . 4 Even Rav Kook, who rules leniently like Rabbeinu Yerucham regarding most positive mitzvot, and does not obligate expenditure of more than a tenth and forbids spending more than a fifth, 5 nevertheless does not take the Decree of Usha into consideration regarding the obligation to make aliya. 6 .
It is even harder to understand the law allowing a person to leave Israel at a time of famine, in the words of the Rambam, "if the fruit is inexpensive but he does not have money (to buy them) and he has no work, not even a penny in his pocket ". 7 Why was this leniency not limited to a case where he loses a fifth or a tenth of his possessions? Especially, according to the Rambam's own view that the restrictions of the Decree of Usha apply to every positive mitzvah! The only amount mentioned exempting from living in Israel is that he does not have "even a penny in his pocket" nor any way to make money – significantly more than a fifth or even a tenth!
In summary, we see that according to all of the earlier rishonim and achronim who dealt with the topic, the "economical justification" not to live in Israel is not defined by the Decree of Usha. Even if one must permanently lower his standard of living considerably, he is obligated to live in Israel. So maintain the modern poskim, from the different streams as well, including the Chazon Ish, R. Herzog, R. Uziel, R. Goren, R. Ovadia Yosef, R. Yitzchak Ya'akov Weiss, R. Shlomo Zalman Aurbach, R. Eliezer Waldenberg, and others. 8 Nevertheless, we must try to understand why the mitzva of aliya demands a much higher monetary sacrifice than most other mitzvot.

E. Mitzvot Exempt from the Decree of Usha
Mitzvot which obligate spending all of his money
Indeed, the mitzvah of living in Israel is not alone, in this regard. The g’mara states that one is obligated to redeem his son even if those five sla'im is all that he owns, and that the same applies to "aliya la'regel", the holiday pilgrimage to Yerushalayim. 9 The Chafetz Chaim asks, why are they not exempted by the Decree of Usha (that one is not allowed to spend more than 20% of his money on a mitzva)? 10 Similarly, R. Ya’akov Emdin asks on the Decree of Usha from the obligation of a pauper to beg (!), if necessary, in order to have four cups of wine on Pesach, Chanukah candles and Shabbat candles. 11 He also questions how the halacha regarding his money can be more strict than that regarding his life? For if non-observance of a positive mitzvah one is lashed " until his soul leaves him ", 12 how much more so should he need to spend more than 20% of his possessions in order to keep that same mitzva! 13
Similarly, we find that Rabban Gamliel acquired an etrog for 1,000 zuz, 14 ostensibly, a violation of the Decree of Usha. Likewise, no one is exempt from the mitzvah of having children, despite the fact that this often involves an expenditure of more than a fifth or a tenth of his possessions. We don’t even find that the Decree of Usha exempts one from the rabbinical mitzva 15 of having more children (even after he already fulfilled the mitzvah of pru ur’vu by having a son and a daughter). 16
In addition, we don’t say that it is forbidden to provide a Jewish education for your children, even when by doing so, it often uses up a large percentage of his wages (especially in America, where annual Jewish tuition often costs $15,000 for each child). On the contrary, we are explicitly instructed that poverty is davka the way of Torah, "you shall eat (even only) bread and salt, and drink water", 17 and "the words of Torah are only upheld by those who kill themselves over them". 18 This halacha is also phrased in monetary terms, "one is obligated to pay all of his money (if necessary) for his Torah learning, and for that of his sons", 19 and "one should always sell everything he owns in order to marry the daughter of a talmid chacham... and one should always sell everything he owns in order to marry his daughter to a talmid chacham". 20 This is not just philosophy, as it is cited as halacha in the Rif 21 , the Rosh 22 and the Rambam 23 .
Despite the opinions of the Rambam, Tosafot, Rosh and Rabbeinu Yerucham that we brought at the beginning of this article, 24 who hold that the Decree of Usha provides the financial framework for every positive mitzva, from the many aforementioned sources, it appears that there is not only no prohibition, but often even an obligation to spend more than 20%, if necessary.
The Talmud Yerushalmi learns from the pasuk "honor Hashem from your wealth", 25 that one is obligated to honor Him with everything that he owns. "From what He has given you tithe leket, shikcha and peah, tithe t’rumah and ma’aser rishon, ma’aser sheni, ma’aser ani and challah, and make a succah, shofar, lulav, tefillin and tzitzit, and feed the hungry and poor and give drink to the thirsty. If you have, you are obligated in all of them, and if you don’t have, you are not obligated in any of them". 26 The obligation has no set amount and no limitation.
Even in the Talmud Bavli, 27 according to the initial understanding of Rav Huna, who says "for mitzvot, up to a third", meaning a third of his ownings, the only question raised there is, "if he has the opportunity to do three mitzvot does he have to give up all of his ownings?" On the other hand, there is no mention in this sugya of 20% or 10% or of the Decree of Usha. 28 To the contrary, if one is obligated to add a third in order to beautify a mitzva, "how much more so for the mitzva itself". 29 Moreover, according to the g'mara’s question, it is impossible to calculate any percentage of one’s money that he is obligated to spend on a positive mitzva, as a similar question can be asked about the sum of 20% (as indeed the Yerushalmi asks, what if he encounters five mitzvot?). The Ra’avad 30 writes that one is obligated in order to keep a positive mitzva, to spend as much as is needed "as long as he won’t become impoverished and be dependant on people". Likewise, the Ran writes "each and every one of us is obligated to give according to his financial capability, in order to observe a positive mitzva, like Rabban Gamliel who acquired an etrog for 1,000 zuz." 31
The Mahari Weill, also holds that the Decree of Usha does not apply to every positive mitzva, but he goes to the opposite, extremely lenient direction. That for every positive mitzva there is no need to spend 20%, or even 10%. Only regarding several exceptional mitzvot, a specific cost is explicitly noted (such as "with all that you have"). 32
We find that, according to these opinions, the Decree of Usha applies only to the mitzva of tzedaka. Their case is strengthened by the words of Rashi, 33 who writes, "one who lavishes on poor people, 34 should not lavish more than 20%". It is true, that the reason given in the g'mara applies equally to all the mitzvot - "lest he become dependant on others". Yet it is particularly necessary to consider this factor regarding helping the poor, about which is written "and your brother shall live with you" - and how will it help if by giving your money to a pauper, you yourself become a pauper?!?" And indeed, in just about all of the examples in both the Bavli and the Yerushalmi where they apply the Decree of Usha, they are dealing with the mitzva of tzedaka. 35
On the other hand, the sugya in Baba Kama, 36 proves that there is a limitation on expenditure in order to fulfill a positive mitzva, but not that of Usha! On the contrary, that one should not spend more than 33% of his possessions. This is opposed to the opinion that one should spend everything that he has to keep a positive mitzva. Apparently, there is a disagreement between the different sugyot in the g'mara, because we have already seen that there are mitzvot, even rabbinical ones, for which one is obligated to spend all of his money. 37

2. The warning that he may become impoverished applies equally to all mitzvot
As we have seen, the Chafetz Chaim brings the opinion of the Ra’avad, 38 and the Bach cites the Ran, 39 who maintain that in order to keep other positive mitzvot, one is obligated to spend all of his money. It is hard to understand how they say this, as both the Ra’avad and the Ran cite the g'mara that "one who gives money shouldn’t lavish more than a fifth", with regard to other mitzvot, not just tzedaka.
We can understand the apparent contradiction by explaining that in citing that g'mara, they are not saying that they hold by the Decree of Usha, but rather to its rationale , that one must be careful not to become poverty-stricken. As we saw in the Chafetz Chaim, if a person holds a steady job, even if he spends a large percentage on mitzvot, he should not have to resort to begging. This rationale applies to equally to all mitzvot - "that he shouldn’t become a pauper and become dependent on the community" (as the Rashba writes in Baba Kama, where he quotes the Ra’avad in greater elaboration). It is clear that the Ra’avad didn’t intend to compare all the mitzvot to tzedaka regarding the amount of the limitation (20%) for he obligates spending all of one’s money, up until poverty, and he adds "for poverty is like death - but in any case, not like actual death". From here we learn that the Ra’avad and the Rashba are of the opinion that not only is it permissable, but it’s even obligitary, to spend more than 20% on other positive mitzvot.
According to this understanding of the Rashba and the Ra’avad, we can explain the apparent confusion regarding the decision of the Shulchan Aruch. On one hand, he rules according to the Decree of Usha only regarding tzedaka, 40 while in the Beit Yosef, in connection to buying an etrog, 41 he brings the saying "one who gives etc." in the name of the Rashba and the Ra’avad, something which he did not include in the Shulchan Aruch. In the Beit Yosef he continues by explaining that the Ra’avad and the Rashba are more stringent than the Rosh. He also cites the opinion of Rabbeinu Yerucham, but questions on what basis he connects the mitzva of tzedaka to other positive mitzvot, applying the Decree of Usha to them, as well. Apparently, the Beit Yosef is strict and rules that the amount of 20% does not limit other positive mitzvot like it does for tzedaka, 42 nevertheless, he quotes the rationale of Usha as a warning not to spend too much and risk poverty. In contrast, the Rama rules regarding the laws of etrog, according to the lenient opinion of the Rambam, Tosafot and the Rosh, that one should not spend more than 20% on a positive mitzva, even if it will pass him by. 43

3. Summary of the opinions regarding other positive mitzvot
We can summarize the three approaches to the Decree of Usha as follows:
a. Those holding that the Decree applies only to the mitzva of tzedaka, and not to all of the positive mitzvot, for which one should spend even more than 20%, until the point that his life becomes difficult. This is the opinion of the rishonim of Spain (the R’ma, Ra’avad, Rashba, Ran and Nimukei Yosef), Beit Yosef, Bach, Chavot Yair, Ya’avetz (R. Ya’akov Emdin), Maharitz Chayut (up to a third of his assets) and the Mishnah Brurah (in most cases, where he has a regular job).
b. Those of the opinion that the Decree was only regarding tzedaka, but regarding other positive mitzvot there is no minimum given, not even 10% . So maintain Rashi and the Mahari Weill. R. Moshe Feinstein considers this option, but apparently does not accept it.
c. Those who apply the Decree of Usha to all positive mitzvot, and say that just as by charity, one may (and should) spend up to 20% regarding other mitzvot, and they are: the Rambam, Tosafot, Rosh, Rama, Magen Avraham and the Vilna Gaon.
Despite these differing opinions, we have already seen that unanimously, regarding certain mitzvot, there is explicitly no maximum expenditure whatsoever. Apparently, even opinions b and c, agree that certain mitzvot are simply above the regular limitations. If so, we must search for additional conditions and definitions in order to complete the puzzle.

F. Important Mitzvot Oblige More Expenditure
As opposed to positive mitzvot, where there are limitations on the expenditure (either 20% or until it makes his life difficult), one is obligated to spend all of his money in order not to transgress even one negative mitzva. 44 The Rivash explains that this is because negative mitzvot are more severe than positive ones. 45 Accordingly, if there are positive mitzvot that are especially important, one should also be obligated to spend more on them than on regular positive mitzvot.
We have previously seen that among these especially "important mitzvot", there are even some rabbinical decrees where one is obligated to go begging in order to observe, even selling his clothes, if necessary, for publicizing a miracle (Chanukah candles and the 4 cups of wine on Pesach) and for shalom bayit (Shabbat candles). 46
Consequently, we can understand how even the Rambam 47 and the Rosh 48 , who are both of the opinion that the limitations of Usha apply to other positive mitzvot as well as tzedaka, nevertheless, cite the aforementioned g'mara in P'sachim that "one should always sell everything he owns in order to marry the daughter of a talmid chacham… and he should always sell everything that owns in order to marry his daughter to a talmid chacham".
Similarly, Rav Moshe Feinstein, who rules against giving more than 20% to tzedaka, 49 permits spending more than this amount for the sake of those who learn Torah, 50 as does the Chafetz Chaim. 51 Chazal teach us that "one should exile himself to a place of Torah". 52 Should one ask: "isn’t exile more costly than 20% of his possessions? Not only should it not be obligatory, but based on the Decree of Usha, it should be forbidden?" The answer is, similar to negative mitzvot, because of the importance of the mitzvah of learning Torah (equated with the other mitzvot combined 53 ), the rabbis did not apply the limitations of Usha.
The Lvush offers a different reason for the limitation on expenditure for positive mitzvot, "one is not commanded to give all of his money in order to observe (a positive mitzvah) and thus, bringing himself to be dependent upon the community. It is better to be passive and not do the mitzvah, even if it is a mitzvah which will pass. Thus, although this mitzvah will be cancelled, nevertheless, he will be able to keep many more, other mitzvot". 54 Accordingly, we understand why the mitzvah of learning Torah is different, because it in itself brings the person to fulfill many other positive mitzvot. 55 Therefore, in order to observe it, one has to push himself that much more, as we have seen, even to the point of "you should eat bread and salt".
Both reasons, that of the Rivash and L’vush respectively, explaining why Usha does not apply to the mitzvah of learning Torah, apply also to the mitzvah of living in Israel, which is also "considered equal to all the other mitzvot combined", 56 "the nail upon which the entire Torah hangs", 57 and is "a mitzvah which includes all of the Torah", 58 and many of the mitzvot depend on it. 59 So much so that Hashem says, "The Land of Israel is more beloved to me than anything else". 60
If a mitzvah which is intended to increase shalom bayit (Shabbat candles) has no limitation of expenditure, then how much more so regarding the mitzvah of living in Israel, which supercedes shalom bayit. 61 According to many, the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisrael is the only mitzvah which, in order to observe, one is allowed to ask a non-Jew to do a torah (d'oraita) prohibition on Shabbat. 62 It is also singled out from among the mitzvot as the only mitzvah that one must actively endanger his life "milechatchila", in order to observe (to conquer Eretz Yisrael). 63 One explanation cited by some rishonim, is that its unique status, in comparison with other mitzvoth, stems from the fact that it helps all of Israel, even the future generations. 64
When we say that many mitzvot depend on fulfilling the mitzvah of living in Israel, that does not only refer to the 58 agricultural mitzvot that can only be observed in Israel. Rather we see that in Israel it is easier to keep mitzvot such as Shabbat, kashrut, and even "easy miztvot" like counting the days of the week in connection to Shabbat ("remember the Shabbat day"), use of the Jewish date, and speaking Hebrew. 65 Even the daily meeting with many other Jews provides the opportunity to keep many other mitzvot between man and his fellow man, which one doesn’t have the opportunity to keep with such frequency and intensity in chutz la'Aretz. In addition, living in Israel enables and obligates all of the national and communal mitzvot, such as serving in the army in a milchemet mitzva, milu’im, etc. as well as the many social mitzvot like tzedaka which are fulfilled on a totally different level when done on a national or governmental basis. 66
The mitzvah of living in Israel is special both quantatively and qualitatively. Quantatively – it is fulfilled every second, every minute, no matter what you are doing, 67 and qualitatively – for the main fulfillment of all of the mitzvot, even those which are an obligation upon the individual, is only in Israel. 68 So much so, that the Rashba uses this rationale to explain the saying of chazal "one who lives outside Israel is considered as one who does not have a G-d". 69 Fulfilling this mitzvah also brings about the ingathering of the exiles and hastening of the ge’ula. 70
Apparently, one of the reasons explaining why all of the rishonim and achronim did not apply the limits of Usha regarding aliya is due to the special importance of the mitzvah of living in Israel and/or the fact that it enables an incredible number of additional mitzvot. Moreover, there are even poskim who go so far as to oblige a person to go begging (!) in order to keep this mitzvah, for, in the words of the Avnei Nezer, "I don’t know 71 if the prohibition of not becoming dependant on others, applies to (this) continuous mitzvah which is considered equal to all the other mitzvoth (=aliya)". 72
Although it seems that most poskim disagree with the Avnei Nezer, it should be noted that the many people throughout the generations who lived off of the "chaluka" charity sent from Europe, apparently acted in accordance with his opinion.

^ 1. Resp. HaRashbash 2.
^ 2.Resp. HaMaharit 1, 134.
^ 3.We mentioned above that today, the Ministry of Absorption covers the entire cost of the flight to make aliya.
^ 4.Introduction to his siddur Sulam Beit El, Lemberg edition, 5764, pp. 13-14. As many others both preceding and following him, R. Ya'akov Emdin consistently and conspicuously uses the term "obligation" or "mandatory", regarding the mitzva of aliya, posing a difficulty for the opinion of R. Moshe Feinstein (see above footnote 3). See also his "Definition of Living in Israel", Mor Uktziyah, Or. Ch. p. 15 in the Altuna edition, 5521.
^ 5.Resp. Mishpat Kohen 143
^ 6.For example, Resp. Mishpat Kohen 147.
^ 7.Rambam, Hil. Melachim 5, 9, according to Baba Batra 91a.
^ 8.Cited in Me'afar Kumi, p. 82.
^ 9.Kiddushin 29b.
^ 10.Be’ur Halacha, 5256, "Afilu".
^ 11.See Shulchan Aruch, O. Ch. 472, 13; 5271, 1.
^ 12.Chulin 132b.
^ 13.Mor Uktziya, O. Ch. 5256.
^ 14.Succah 41b.
^ 15.Rambam, Hil. Ishut 15, 16.
^ 16.See Resp. Igrot Moshe E. H. 4, 32:3; Tztiz Eliezer 9, 51, 2:6.
^ 17.Avot 6, 4.
^ 18.Brachot 63b.
^ 19.Tanchuma Tzav, 14.
^ 20.P'sachim 49b.
^ 21.P'sachim 16a in the folios of the Rif.
^ 22.Pesachim 3b, see there in the abridged psakim of the Rosh and in the Tur E. H. 2, where it seems that this discussion is one of the few cases where the Tur disagrees with his father, the Rosh.
^ 23.Hil. Isurei Bi’ah 21, 32. On the other hand, ןt should be noted that the Shulchan Aruch changes from his norm and overtly changes the wording of the Rambam, apparently because of the question we are raising on this extreme statement.
^ 24.Footnotes 12-15.
^ 25.Mishlei 3, 9.
^ 26.Pe'ah 1, 1.
^ 27.Baba Kama 9b.
^ 28.See also Chiddushei HaMaharetz Chayut on Rosh Hashana 27a, that one is obligated to spend a third of his possessions to observe a mitzvah. His opinion is difficult, for this is only the initial understanding in the g’mara in Baba Kama, which is later disproved.
^ 29.Be’ur Halacha 5256, 1, "Afilu".
^ 30.Shita Mikubetzet, Baba Kama 9b.
^ 31.Sucah 16a in the folios of the Rif.
^ 32. Mahari Weill, 157.
^ 33.Ketuvot 50a.
^ 34.In what is termed the "first edition" of Rashi, he comments: "from his possessions to hekdesh", which infers that he is not just referring to tzedaka. However in the later edition (printed) he changed this and wrote "one who spends money on poor people". And so R. Epstein, Tarbitz 305, p. 16 and 312 p. 79, proves that the version of Rashi printed in the Shita Mikubetzet is not Rashi, but rather Rivan. See Rashi on Chulin 132b, where he explains that regarding the mitzvot of succah and lulav, "there is no chisaron kis (monetary loss) at all" - from this it seems that also they have a limitation, but less than that of tzedaka (possibly like the Mahari Weill).
^ 35.See above in footnote 11, for the exception. There is room to suggest that the disagreement there is actually based upon the point in question, did they decree in Usha regarding all the mitzvot, or just tzedaka.
^ 36.See footnote 74.
^ 37.For an alternative explanation, see Resp. Chavot Yair, 186.
^ 38.See footnote 77.
^ 39.See footnote 78.
^ 40.Shulchan Aruch Y. D. 249,1.
^ 41. Beit Yosef O. Ch. 4256, "Katav HaRosh".
^ 42.So the Chafetz Chaim, Be'ur Halacha 4256, explains the Beit Yosef's opinion. This as opposed to the Igrot Moshe (O. Ch. 5, 43:10) who understands that the Beit Yosef is lenient like the Mahari Weill, and says that there is no need to spend more than 20%. Note that the explanation of the Mishnah Brurah and the Igrot Moshe of the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch are based on the fact that he does not mention the opinion of the Rosh in the Shulchan Aruch (despite the fact that he does cite it in the Beit Yosef, but with a question on Rabbeinu Yerucham) and therefore, seemingly the Beit Yosef abandoned his norm of ruling according to the Rambam and the Rosh when they agree.
^ 43.In the Darkei Moshe HaKatzar (printed in the regular edition of the Tur), he only brings the opinion of the Ran and the Nimukei Yosef (according to the opinion of the Ra'avad). Seemingly, he rules like them and like the Beit Yosef. But in the Darkei Moshe HaAroch (the original) the source of his comment is the Rosh and not the Ra'avad. Several poskim mistakenly rule according to the Darkei Moshe HaKatzar that the 20% limit is only regarding tzedaka and not other positive mitzvot, contradicting the Rama in his comment on the Shulchan Aruch.
^ 44.Rashba, Baba Kama 9b; Resp. Ridbaz 4, 145; Rama Y.D. 157, 1 cites the Ran, Ra’avad, and others.
^ 45.Resp. HaRivash 387.
^ 46.See footnotes 56-70.
^ 47.Hil. Issurei Biyah 21, 32.
^ 48.P'sachim 3, 1.
^ 49.Igrot Moshe Y. D. 1, 143.
^ 50.Ibid, and 4, 37, 11.
^ 51.Ahavat Chesed 20,4.
^ 52.Avot 4, 14.
^ 53.Pe'ah 1, 1.
^ 54.L’vush O. Ch. 4256, 1.
^ 55.See Baba Kama 17a, "Learning is greater than the action because it leads to action".
^ 56.Sifri, Devarim 12 and Tosefta Ovadah Zara 5, 2.
^ 57.R. Ya’akov Emdin, see footnote 51.
^ 58.Or HaChaim at the end of Parshat Nitzavim.
^ 59.Maharal, Gur Aryeh, Breishit 1, 1.
^ 60.Bamidbar Rabba 23, 7.
^ 61.Divorce, if one of the couple does not wish to make aliya, Shulchan Aruch E. H. 75, 3.
^ 62.Shulchan Aruch O. Ch. 306, 11.
^ 63.As opposed to the three cardinal sins, idolatry, adultery and murder, where one must first attempt to avoid the situation. See Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook, Eretz Tzvi (in memory of my friend Tzvi Glatt, HY"D), p. 201.
^ 64.Ramban on Shabbat 130b; Resp. HaRivash 101.
^ 65.See the article "The Mitzvah to Speak Hebrew".
^ 66.See Resp. Tzitz Eliezer 9, 1,5(2), that by paying tax in Israel, one fulfills the mitzvah of tzedaka.
^ 67.Sefer Charedim 59; R. Menashe Klein, Resp. Mishneh Halachot 2, 56 and 3, 189; R. M. Shternbuch, Moadim VeZemanim 5, 346.
^ 68.Sifri on Devarim 6, 1. See Rashi, Ramban (also Vayikra 18, 25) and Rabbeinu B'chayei on that pasuk. And see also the Netziv in HaAmek Davar Shmot 20,12, and in his approbation letter to Ahavat Chesed of the Chafetz Chaim, that even intellectual mitzvot like honoring parents, which seemingly are identical in all places, their main fulfillment is in Israel, as it says "in order to increase your days and your childrens' days on the land".
^ 69.Resp. Rashba 134.
^ 70.Y'shuot Malko Y. D. 66. Moreover, the center of Torah learning in the world in our generation is in Israel. R. Y.M. Charlap, Mimaynei HaYeshua, p. 196, learns of the importance of this mitzvah also from the attempts of the non-Jews to prevent us from observing this particular mitzvah.
^ 71.Such wording is based upon humility, yet that is, in fact, usually the writer's opinion. See Sdei Chemed, vol. 9, pp. 182-183, in the 5727 edition.
^ 72.Resp. Avnei Nezer, Y.D. 2, 454, 55.

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